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December 18, 2006

Tenets for a Useful Military

Continuing the series begun here and continued here, this installment looks at the characteristics the United States should desire in the Army it builds for the 21st century.

I see seven critical tenets for a successful military force: deterrence, deployability, flexibility, scalability, support, deference, and minimizing temptation. Let's take a look at each.

Deterrence is one of the most important things a good military provides to the country, because the most successful wars are those that never need be fought. All things being equal, the United States would be far better off never fighting another war. One means of securing that is to have a military that is clearly able to defeat its country's enemies. That is not foolproof by any means, but a strong, capable military does tend to make enemies think twice prior to engaging in military actions. Conversely, deterrence also requires a judicious use of military force. Getting engaged in one area requires either ramping up one's military forces to maintain a deterrent to other enemies, or accepting the loss of that deterrent as long as one is engaged in combat, as we now see in Iraq. Further, a failed engagement can destroy one's deterrent, as we saw in the aftermath of Somalia when al Qaeda was encouraged by our decision to leave after the battle of Mogadishu, and as we are likely to see again if we leave Iraq without a clear victory. Despite the fact our actual military abilities were undamaged after Somalia and may actually be better after Iraq and Afghanistan with a cadre of combat-hardened soldiers, the perception of defeat will still undermine the Army's deterrent value. Deterrence is more than big battalions; it requires a degree of judiciousness as well.

The United States has been fortunate throughout its history by its separation from other powers. The last real threat of foreign invasion of the United States dates back to the War of 1812. When we have gone to war, it has been on foreign shores far from the U.S. That means that our military force must be able to get to where the fighting is relatively quickly and effectively. Since World War II we have used military bases spread across the world to preposition forces in order to reach conflicts more rapidly. Our experience with radical Islam should have taught us the problem with such a policy: one of al Qaeda's signature grievances with the United States was our stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia. And while the majority of American troops overseas conduct themselves honorably, there are always bad apples in the mix, and it only takes one to rouse a people to ask why they must tolerate foreign military forces on their soil. Those who think those nationals should be grateful for our presence might consider the Third Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rest assured, the British Empire believed that colonists should have been grateful for the presence of British soldiers stationed there to protect them from Indians. There is no reason for us to borrow trouble and bad feelings to base soldiers overseas when it is unnecessary. Instead we should focus on building a force we can move where it needs to go if the need arises and not before.

Flexibility speaks to the issues I noted in my last essay. Our military needs to be able to fight in any environment and in all kinds of warfare, from high-intensity combat (HIC) to counterinsurgency (COIN). Because COIN is so difficult, that means a great deal of time should be spent on developing highly-disciplined forces who can perform COIN missions successfully. However, that does not mean that we can allow our HIC abilities to go by the wayside; our forces need to be equipped and trained in HIC as well. Balancing the two will be difficult, and we will probably want to focus some forces in each area to give us an immediate capability for either style of conflict while our other forces switch their focus should it become necessary. What we do not want to do, however, is have any part of the force (outside of the Special Forces) focus entirely on one form of conflict to the exclusion of all others, for if there is one lesson we should take from our latest warfighting experiences, it should be that if we do go to war, the entire force will be expected to fight regardless of the type of war we face.

Scalability is the ability to expand the force if necessary. The U.S. should maintain a relatively small military commensurate with its goals, but it must be able to ramp up to a larger force in time of war. That means not only competent reserve forces, but also a plan in place to expand the active force if war breaks out. One of the biggest problems our armed forces have had in the post-Cold War era has been a failure to tailor forces to requirements. During the 1990s, the military was likely too large for what it was asked to do. In the 2000s, the military is clearly too small to attend to the tasks the nation has asked of it. We should build our forces with an eye towards expanding them during time of crisis; had the government asked for volunteers in the days following the September 11 attacks, for example, we could have easily expanded our military forces to meet our needs, and then reduce them again once the fighting was over. Our decision to use a one-size-fits-all force has left us with too much and too little military force in turns, a highly ineffective use of our resources.

Support refers to supporting our allies. We have not fought a major war on our own since the 19th century, and there is little reason to believe we will do so in the 21st century. That means that our armed forces have to be able to work with foreign forces from around the world. That means building a force that can work with others operationally and logistically. It means soldiers learning foreign languages; at a minimum, all field grade officers ought to be fluent in at least one foreign language, and the incentives for learning languages should be increased significantly to encourage all soldiers to improve their ability to work with other nations. This will also require a careful examination of likely allies' capabilities to ensure that we can work together with them. Our radios have to be able to communicate with theirs, for example, and the more basic systems (fuel, ammunition, etc.) we have in common, the easier it will be for us to sustain both our forces and theirs when we work together. Also, while I would reduce foreign basing to a minimum, joint exercises would still be a priority for the military, as the more forces work together, the more effective they can be in time of war.

Deference to civilian authority is an important part of the American military tradition. Military personnel don't like being told what to do by civilians. As a rule, civilians are remarkably ignorant of what the military is actually like, with most of their exposure coming at the theater. Nonetheless, it is civilians who must decide when the nation should go to war and, when it does, what goals it should have. It is therefore vital that our military forces have leaders who are strong enough to explain what our military can and cannot do honestly, and then doing their best to execute the goals given to them by the government. Yes, the generals are smart men and women whose knowledge should be respected, but their knowledge still must be subordinated to political goals. Building such a corps will require a Congress and executive willing to remove generals who fail to live up to such requirements. Our civilian leaders would do well to remember the words of Abraham Lincoln, who when told that a Brigadier General and a train of horse and mules had been captured by Confederate forces observed, "I don't care about losing generals; I can make them. But horses and mules cost money." I do not want to denigrate the hard work and contributions of our generals. I consider myself a pretty smart and hard working guy, but I'm never going to be a general; they are truly exceptional men and women. But sometimes smart people can forget that there are other smart people out there as well; the military's civilian leadership needs to make sure they understand where they stand.

Finally, our military must be built in such a way as to minimize the temptation it offers our government leaders to overuse it. Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously asked Colin Powell what the use of a magnificent military was if it couldn't be used, a philosophy that led to an exceptionally busy final decade of the 20th century for the U.S. military. Military force is seductive, in that it seems to offer a degree of decisiveness that diplomacy generally lacks. A large military makes military action entirely too tempting for government, particularly in an age when Congress has abdicated its responsibilities and allows Presidents almost carte blanche to wage war as they see fit. A good military, then, needs to be relatively small to reduce the temptation to use it. Obviously this goal is in tension with deterrence, but given our military preeminence and the lack of true military threats against the United States, it should not take a massive military to deter our enemies from foolish actions, particularly if it is coupled with the other tenets outlined here to make it a dangerous force.