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March 13, 2005

Rethinking the Draft II

In my first essay on this topic, I discussed the relative costs of a draft vs. simply spending the money necessary to attract sufficient volunteers to expand the active force. However, while I think that finances alone undermine the feasability of a massive draft, the ideal of developing a large Reserve force capable of augmenting the active force as required founders on our own history.

In 1990, after Iraq seized Kuwait, the United States began a buildup intended to protect Saudi Arabia and to retake Kuwait. As part of that buildup, several National Guard units were mobilized and sent to military installations to train to go to war. Not one of those units ever left the United States nor took place in the subsequent campaign to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The train-up of the units took so long (in part due to the Army's failure to utilize the pre-war methodology the units prepared for) that no National Guard combat units was declared ready for war until the cessation of hostilities.

In response to this failure, Congress created roughly 6,000 new billets for the Army to fill. Known as AC/RC (Active Component/Reserve Component), these active soldiers would work with National Guard and Reserve units in order to ensure that their training was sufficient to get them to war in a timely fashion. Congress also restructured the Guard, creating 15 'Enhanced Separate Brigades' which would get more funding and priority for training resources and which would in exchange be the first units sent in the event of war. These changes would make the Guard a reliable combat multiplier, allowing the Army to go to war with active forces, back them up with eSBs within months, and fill out the force with National Guard divisions as required within a year.

Observers of the situation in Iraq know that this blueprint hasn't even approached what has actually happened. While our extended sojourn in Iraq and Afghanistan has meant that every eSB has been used for a combat tour at this point, none reached theater until well after the initial invasion was over. Those that have gone have endured 90+ day train-ups followed by rotations through the National Training Center at Fort Irwin or the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, not reaching theater in some cases until almost eight months after having been mobilized. Hardly the quick reaction force planners envisioned when they drew up the eSBs.

This is not due to Guard units training to the stereotypical model of a weekend in the woods with guns and beer. Having worked very closely with multiple National Guard units since the start of the war, I can say with confidence that the soldiers are as a rule well-motivated and dedicated to getting ready for combat. The issue is not at all that we have bad soldiers in the Guard.

The problem is simply that 39 days simply isn't enough time to keep units trained to a standard that allows them to go to combat rapidly. After removing the days required for mandatory training, medical and dental exams, transportation to and from training, an annual physical fitness test, equipment maintenance and accountability, and so on, a Guard company has perhaps 20 days available to them for actual training. In that time they have to train their soldiers on individual, squad, platoon, company, and battalion tasks if they are to be prepared to go to war as a battalion. The hard truth is, even active duty units have a hard time doing this. When a battalion prepares to go to NTC or JRTC, it normally goes through a 3-9 month preparatory cycle during which time unit rosters are locked in place to get units used to working together and the battalions work through thoroughly planned echeloned training exercises that bring them up to the standard. In time of war, of course, battalions can go as they are, but their proficiency is bound to suffer. A National Guard battalion faces all of these problems and more besides.

It is not realistic to expect National Guard units to go to war quickly. No matter how hard they work at it, the challenges of managing their units are simply too great to overcome in the time they have available. Most National Guard officers and NCOs have to work significant unpaid time at night and on the weekends simply to keep their units running. Short of requiring more time from all National Guard and Reserve soldiers (men and women who are already giving up, at a minimum, a weekend a month and two weeks every year), attempts to improve the Guard's proficiency are doomed to failure. It simply takes more time than is available to build proficient and lethal battalions and higher. (Companies are borderline; my opinion is that we would do better to focus at the platoon level and below, but some of my colleagues believe Guard units could succeed if they kept their focus at company-level and below.)

Given that it is simply impossible to maintain a reserve force that can step in for the active force when required, the concept advanced by Carter and Glastris doesn't make much sense. Yes, we could greatly expand the Guard and Reserve, so that we have a bigger pool from which to draw in the future. Such an expansion would not address the recruiting problems the Guard and Reserve already face, however, since we would be explicitly saying that Guard/Reserve service will continue to include regular tours on active duty. Further, this takes us back to the issue of cost: who's going to pay for these new Guard and Reserve units, and is that really any cheaper than simply building up the active force to a level commensurate with its responibilities?

The Guard and Reserve are not substitutes for the active force. They are supplements that we can use when we must, and they are of great value to us if they are used carefully. The men and women of the Guard and Reserve are doing great things in Iraq and Afghanistan right now, and they deserve our respect and our thanks. But it is not a disservice to them to note that they're doing things that fall well outside the purview of what their service can structurally support. Expanding the structure will not resolve the systemic weaknesses of the Guard/Reserve structure, and expanding the reserve forces via a draft would not do much to help meet our military requirements.