November 02, 2003

More News From Iraq

A recently-promoted friend has provided me with a new report from Iraq. This one looks at some infantry operations and includes some good assessments of what we're seeing in Iraq and what that means for the occupation and reconstruction. As usual, my comments are interspersed.

A note from an infantry battalion commander in Iraq who used to work in the TRADOC DCSINT. A great unclas run-down/SITREP with a definite intel slant.

Attached are OIF observations.

1. Weapons and Munitions Availability - The amount of weapons and ammunition readily available is astounding. Every house, every single one of them, had multiple automatic weapons when we arrived. Arms dealers were everywhere; dealing military weapons is easy and very profitable. There were complete mortars of varying sizes for sale on the main road in Ba'Qubah when we first entered the city. Raiding a weapons bazaar was, in fact, our first mission in the city and we seized over 20 mortars at a roadside stand on the city's main street.

Iraqi Nationals have looted weapons and munitions from the many military installations throughout our area of operations, which in turn, provide a ready market for the arms dealers mentioned above. Weapons are hidden everywhere, Date Palm orchards, irrigation canals, even in graveyards (which would create quite a stink if Americans began searching in the graves for weapons caches, as I am sure you can imagine). We have found women hiding weapons underneath their black gowns, which may not seem like such a good idea until you consider that only female soldiers can search 12 females. This presents a challenge at remote sites and checkpoints. While we have not found WMD, we have come across lots of chemical defensive equipment, to include nerve agent antidote, MOPP suits, and masks.

2. Economy/Standard of Living - The economy/standard of living IS very depressed, while unemployment is sky high. We have killed/captured many Iraqis we believe were paid to shoot at us in order to make a little money. The consequence is that these folks usually don't aim very well and shoot wildly erratic, but sometimes they get lucky. Many of these men are reported to be drunk or under the influence of drugs during the commission of their activities (according to HUMINT sources), however, none of the detainees we have processed appear to be under the influence of anything except bad judgment. A little money goes a long way here and we have been pumping so much money into the infrastructure it is crazy.

Regardless of the money pumped into the local economy it has not yet turned the tide. This area has suffered from 35 years of neglect, 12 years of UN sanctions, and the results of a dictatorial leadership; you would not believe how bad everything is.

It appears that corruption is commonplace, lots of black market activities and political graft/bribery. We have made a concerted effort to spend our Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) and our Field Ordering Officer (FOO) monies in our zone of operation. The local purchasing of goods and services are necessary to fill gaps in the military logistical system, which had a significant early impact on the local economy. Our introduction of U.S. dollars into the marketplace without a formal established conversion rate led to uncontrollable inflation and black marketing.

This is probably an inevitable consequence as we try to rebuild, but it's something that will bear a great deal of watching. We have to put the country back together again, but we also have to ensure we leave a functional economy behind. Unfortunately, I'm not certain how to stop it. It's going to take a significant amount of money to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure (see below), and that money isn't just going to vanish once we spend it.

3. Infrastructure - The water system is particularly bad and has been for many years. The water does not meet U.S. standards for potability. Most of the water treatment plants are not functioning because of damage, neglect, or looting of machinery. The electrical grid is overloaded and most rural areas only get electricity for a few hours each day. There has been a huge problem with IZ nationals stealing power cables and bootlegging electrical power. The loss of these power cables makes delivery of electricity to towns even more difficult as only rudimentary rerouting is possible on the electrical grid. Our ability to establish basic services will go a long ways towards stabilizing the country. Electricity has become a key component to coalition strategy, our ability to provide electricity will demonstrate that things are getting better for the Iraqi people.

It is very important to understand previous standards of living in the local environment in order to establish realistic and attainable measures of success when planning and executing infrastructure improvement projects. Though a western-level of infrastructure may be the expectation, it may be an unachievable goal/objective. We measure our progress in local areas without understanding what the standard really is. For example, a well or filter that produces potable drinking water would provide a service never before seen in most of the areas in our zone of operation. To expect water piped into every home is unrealistic for many years to come.

4. Local Populace Attitude - Most of the people are glad Saddam is gone but that is about all they have in common. Political parties are sprouting up but they really do not have set political agendas or platforms. The Kurds are the best when it comes to political organization and this has helped them when we form local governments. The Arabs for the most part do not trust political parties (Ba'ath Party influence, I think) but some have started to form their own parties; primarily as a way to get their foot in the door concerning local politics. Most Iraqi's also feel that the Coalition is a necessary evil to prevent a civil war, but a good portion of these folks would rather we not be here. There are small groups adamantly opposed to our presence but most people take a wait and see" approach to life. They are reluctant to help because they are afraid of the future, which I think they realize will not include U.S./Coalition Forces. Many do not want to be known as "traitors" for helping the Americans.

The Iraqi people have been submitted to a dictatorship that prevented them from voicing their opinions without retribution. Unsure of the future, they are tentative to assist either side for fear of such retribution. Rumors spread like wild fire and are readily believed by the populace. Many are unsure that Saddam is gone for good. The people prefer to remain neutral, often saying, "I saw nothing". There are still many that fear repercussions from other tribes or families if they identify someone as a regime loyalist. The concept of the "Blood Feud" is very much alive and well here. The police do not have much legitimacy at this point so paybacks often occur between families and tribes. Much of the cooperation we get is, in many cases, people "fingering" someone to settle old scores and get even with their adversaries.

Populations that have survived in a brutal regime over the past 35 years should not be expected to rush to the streets, offering unconditional assistance. This people are survivors and very willing to play both sides of the street as long as it is beneficial to do so. Trust must be earned (usually in the form of financial investment and visible improvement projects in the area) before they can be expected to provide assistance or intelligence. Apathy on the part of the general population should not be viewed as a threat to U.S. operations, rather as an untapped resource, yet to be won over.

Despite the arguments made by both sides regarding the feelings of the Iraqis, it's likely the vast majority of them don't have particularly strong feelings about the occupation. They will view U.S. actions on their individual merits, supporting those they believe will be to their benefit and opposing those they believe will be detrimental to them. As long as we're working to improve their situation, we can expect to avoid stirring popular resentment against us. Hoping for significant popular support is unwise. Few people enjoy being seen as a charity case, so even if we do little more than rebuild their infrastructure, we can expect resentment and a desire for Iraqs to take over the job for themselves.

5. Crime/Organized Crime - Crime is rampant. Saddam released all prisoners in Iraqi jails in what he called "the Forgiveness". This was basically just another way he could de-stabilize the area and it also provides Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) with a cadre of triggermen. Organized crime families have been the target of at least one Brigade size raid in our area of operations, which was successful in removing this network. This particular crime family dabbled in various illegal activities and was blatant about their activities. The reader should imagine a "Pancho Villa" type organization as opposed to a traditional Mafia type organization. There is no pretense of respectability and weapons (to include machine guns and hand grenades) were openly carried as a very visible reminder to the local population of the consequences of challenging this criminal element. Reports that this family was engaged with direct action operations against coalition forces were beginning to trickle in, but the destabilizing effect that they had on the local community was sufficient reason to remove them as a major player in this area.

It is important not to try and superimpose western thought, morals, or codes of conduct over activities of local nationals. Virtually every structure not guarded by privately sponsored security has been looted. Entire buildings have virtually disappeared because the local population will loot the very bricks used to build the structure, not to mention the tiles, pipes, wires, windows, doors, etc. Vehicles abandoned on the side of the road are stripped within minutes. The local population steals power lines supporting the national electrical grid and then illegally taps into the electrical system, receiving free power. This unaccounted for requirement adds strain to an already stressed power grid and compounds the problem of getting the grid operating at near capacity levels. Locals also "steal" water for their fields. They dig unauthorized irrigation canals that siphon water from the canals. This significantly reduces the amount of water available at the intended locations, affecting crops further downstream, local population water supplies, and creating artificial shortages. Farmers found doing this believe they have a right to the water as well as anyone else, even though they know digging illegal irrigation ditches is against the law. With very few exceptions, there is no white or black; only shades of gray, We are talking about poverty levels that are staggering and a society of "haves" and "have-nots", One must remember at all times, that almost every local national they come in contact with has a self-motivation.

6. Threat Tactics -Though not backed by a truly conventional military force, his tactics can otherwise be accurately described as those of a guerilla force. Small group tactics, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, and harassing attacks are his line of operations. His intent is not to draw U.S. forces into a larger conflict (see #7), rather, to instill fear and inflict casualties regularly. This may be my COE training coming out but the Threat is clearly aware that military defeat of Coalition forces is unattainable, strategic culmination is a more readily attainable goal and the purpose, I believe, of his attacks.

Threat tactics have evolved to fit the intent of the responsible group and spread to like groups throughout the country. When a TTP is observed in a large population center it quickly becomes prevalent in smaller towns. The ultimate goal the Former Regime Loyalists (FRL), Badr Corps, and criminal groups is to remove Coalition forces from the country. Each has its own reasons for doing so; however, the methods are the same. As mentioned before, I believe they are trying to weaken resolve and attain early withdrawal of Coalition Forces. Success at the tactical level, in my estimation, occurs when the Threat conducts an attack and is not killed or captured, regardless of whether or not this attack resulted in Coalition casualties or damage to equipment. When these groups do inflict injuries on US forces it will be reported in the international media and is seen as a major victory. It also has the intended effect of inspiring other group members to conduct attacks and is an effective recruiting tool. On the other hand, when an attacker is wounded/killed, it deters attacks for a period of time while the group regroups and recruits new members.

The enemy is going to attempt to use the media against us. This does not mean that the media is in any way wrong to report on enemy successes, but it does mean it's crucial for us to publicize the good works we are doing, as well as providing context for the attacks. It is unrealistic to expect that the attacks will stop for the foreseeable future. Success has to be measured in a reduction in the frequency of the attacks, as well as in how frequently we succeed in killing those who strike at our forces.

Initial attacks against Coalition Forces in our zone were direct fire small arms and RPG ambushes. This led to heavy Threat losses with minimal negative impact on our forces. The net effect was that the guerilla force was entering into a war of attrition with Coalition Forces. This tactic rapidly became unsupportable from a threat standpoint and attackers have begun to use tactics that allow for more standoff distance. Small arms fire accuracy is not the Threat's strong point. The threat uses AK-47s with no butt stock and often fire from the hip. They are not very good marksmen. They need to be close to hit you. It is the same with RPGs. They need to be close to hit, especially for moving targets.

The use of command detonated IEDs(Improved Explosive Devices) has become fashionable. Wire leading several hundred meters to a concealed position is common. This has also resulted in heavy Threat causalities when conducted against combat arms units and the threat has further adapted his tactics to target specific units and unit types. See Note No. 7 for more on this TTP. Threat IEDs are very rudimentary, but innovative. Using "daisy-chained" mortar rounds and Artillery rounds on the high end to a shampoo bottle full of C4 on the low end; there is quite a variety. Animal carcasses, vegetable oil cans, fire extinguishers and a bag of garbage have all been used as IEDs. The bottom line is we drive around potholes and any debris on the roads or the sides of roads. Most are not very effective and some do not even ignite. They mostly use command detonation with electrical wire running 200 to 300 meters from the IED location to increase stand off.
Mortar fire is another tactic that rarely results in Coalition casualties but is very safe for the attackers. If you accept that success is defined as the ability to engage and live to engage again another day; mortars becomes the best way for the enemy to be successful. We believe the Threat is setting up their mortars in the direct lay mode and firing within in sight of the Forward Operating Base. They are not precise and the sheaf is fairly dispersed, indicating that the Threat is just shooting in the general direction of the FOB and then quickly evading. We have never had more than one mortar engage at the same time, although I do not know if other FOBs have been engaged by multiple mortars or not. It is very difficult to counter mortar fire. The Threat normally fires three or fewer rounds per engagement and they will engage each target only once per day, very often skipping days between attacks. By the time the rounds begin impacting, the attackers have begun their exfiltration. Acquisition of firing points has been achieved with Q-36/Q-37 radar, although these radars are not designed to acquire mortar trajectories and are normally not reliable. Crater analysis allows us to conduct pattern analysis to determine likely launch points. We can then conduct anti-mortar ambushes with ground forces but there are more launch points than we can realistically cover.
The bottom line, however, is that it is difficult to identify the exact firing point quickly enough to action forces before the attacker flees. It is necessary to work with local residents to identify the perpetrators and the locals are more afraid of the Threat than they are willing to help the Coalition. It all goes back to that "wait and see" mentality. We have, in the Brigade zone, used indirect fires to counter the mortar threat but units must understand the constraints facing them when they conduct this type of response. Given the proximity of non-combatants to threat targets, counter-battery is nearly non-existent because indirect fires are nearly impossible to clear. Further compounding this dilemma is the fact that disposition of U.S. forces in relationship to threat targets often prevent adequate firing solutions above 120mm mortars, minimizing the capability of the 155mm howitzers available for fire support.

7. Why attack the lion when you can attack the sheep? Most attacks when we first arrived in zone were conducted against my infantry patrols. This was a very bad choice of targets and the threat paid dearly for these attacks. Threat planners and financiers have switched tactics to attack log convoys or other soft targets. I believe the Threat has learned to distinguish between units that will stop, establish a base of fire and then maneuver to destroy them versus units that break contact. Our unit marking systems aid this identification. My units are the former as the Threat has discovered over time, and my units have repeatedly passed through areas unscathed only to have another convoy (one that adheres to the "break contact" TTP) trailing 15 minutes behind and get hit with lEDs, RPGs, and small arms fire.

Attacks on convoys in our AO have been deterred by several TTPs. Initially, our BFVs(Bradley Fighting Vehicles), scouts and other combat patrols were ambushed with direct fire and RPGs. Despite their efforts, the threat rarely escaped without suffering casualties. We found that if we maintain contact and immediately attack their positions, the threat will immediately try to break contact and runaway. He knows he cannot win toe to toe with US forces. Unaware of our night fighting capability, they would often mistake distance with safety, thinking we cannot see them. Many would be attackers walked into direct fire engagements initiated by our forces as a result. Occasionally the Threat was successful in initiating ambushes or attacks but very rarely did these cause damage to US forces personnel or equipment. They usually did result in Threat casualties and/or detention. If a convoy is attacked, the element must return fire, maintain contact and attack through the enemy. If not, the threat will escape and fight another day. The threat uses hit and run tactics, but if you do not engage him he will stay and continue to try inflict damage. If a convoy breaks contact, the enemy will escape before a QRF can get out there.

The threat soon stopped ambushing/attacking us with small arms and RPGs and resorted to the use of IEDs. This increased their stand off and increased their chances of escape. Despite this, we still were able to engage them and cause enemy casualties. They have since stopped attacking any of our convoys, resorting instead to attacking vehicle convoys that are not from our task force. We believe that if units look prepared (i.e., gunners up and scanning, crew served weapons manned and scanning, personnel in vehicles facing out and vigilant) then they most likely they will not be attacked.

The threat picks his targets wisely, and given the macho influence of this region, normally attempts to avoid direct contact with prepared and capable forces.

The best deterrence to threat contact is to appear prepared and willing to return fire and destroy the threat.

This news will require a significant change in training and doctrine for U.S. forces. We have always taught convoys to break contact and get out of the kill zone if attacked. But the enemy has adapted his tactics to our doctrine, making our convoys cheap attacks for him. Therefore, we're going to need to train convoys to counterattack when ambushed. While riskier, it will allow us to better deter attacks on our forces, as well as giving us better odds of eliminating those willing to attack us. Changing the mindset of support soldiers will be a big challenge for U.S. forces, but such an adaption is clearly necessary to address new enemy tactics.

8. Strange bedfellows (opposition groups teaming up) - The adage that my enemy's enemy is my ally is very much alive in this AO. Groups (both political and religious) that previously opposed each other quickly find common ground when they share a common enemy (e.g. U.S. forces). At the same time, one cannot assume that these types of alliances are automatic given a common foe, as the side can/do play each side against each other, in an attempt to eliminate both threats simultaneously.

9. Sheiks -A balance between Sheiks (family heads), professionals (educated citizens), religious leaders (Imams), and political party leaders is essential in establishing a functional and legitimate government. Appointed/selected positions and social perception are essential to the preservation of the Sheiks status within this society. In addition, it is imperative to ascertain the difference between a legacy Sheik (one who inherited the position/title through legitimate family ascension) and "90s" Sheiks, appointed by the former regime based upon loyalty or wealth.

To combat local populace apathy and vendettas, we must hold the local sheiks and people accountable for actions that occur in their towns/villages. They would much rather have us work with the Sheiks then clear every house in their village. The local villages and towns are fairly closed and are very aware of outsiders when they come in to their town. After a relationship is established with a sheik, he will often identify troublemakers and outsiders that don belong in the area. We try to make them understand that the more peaceful the town, the more NGO's come in, the more money, the more improvement.

10. Government/limited CA -The traditional BN/TF is ill-equipped (and manned) to conduct "nation-building" without significant augmentation and training (e.g. establishment of government, police, judicial, and financial activities). Persona talents may mitigate this shortfall, but it does not correct the systemic shortage of trained resources.

Tactical Human Intelligence Teams, Tactical Psyops Teams, Civil Affairs, and translators all contribute significantly to successful interaction between the local populace and Coalition Forces. These assets, as critical a they are, do not prepare the commander for his role in assisting in the formation of local governments, entering into negotiations, and dealing with Sheiks and other community leaders.

Translators MUST be provided early on in theater in order to facilitate day-to-day operations. Units cannot plan-on or rely-on English-speaking local nationals for this duty, as many locals will remain apart from U.S. forces until the situation stabilizes.

I have heard rumors that the new Army Chief of Staff is planning on redesigning the Army (to include the Reserves and National Guard) to provide more critical specialists such as those mentioned here. Until and unless that happens, however, these shortages are going to continue to impact our occupation. Units are going to have to learn how to improvise for the foreseeable future.

One final thought; the biggest combat multiplier is money. Population approval and acceptance is the decisive point and while combat operations against non-compliant forces are necessary, they should not be viewed as the task Forces Main Effort.

This will be the decisive point at home as well. How much money are we willing to spend in Iraq? Are we willing to accept a low, but constant stream of U.S. casualties? If the Bush Administration can't maintain support for the occupation, both popular and financial, our efforts in Iraq will fail.

Posted at 11:16 AM · War: Lessons Learned · Comments (6) · TrackBack (3)

September 16, 2003

Some News from the Front

CPT (P) Jason Slider sent out these notes he'd received (he had to reproduce them, so they are undoubtedly not 100% accurate) from a friend in 7th ID headquarters. They're reflections on some lessons the 3d ACR has learned during their time in Iraq. They include some pretty interesting and valuable observations, so I've reproduced them below, along with my own observations here and there. Readers should understand that while I stand by my observations, I'm a senior captain who's never been to combat, while these are lieutenant colonels that have 20+ years of service and have actually served in a combat environment.

Tactical Command and Leadership Issues for OIF

LTC William T. Dolan, Squadron Commander, 1/3 ACR
LTC Tobin Green, Squadron Commander, 2/3 ACR

1. Combat Discipline: The most important issue for the conduct of operations in Iraq. Because of the uncertain nature of the mission, constant threat, and autonomous operation, small unit combat discipline includes watching your sector, wearing the uniform correctly, preparing for convoys, security operations during movement, cleaning weapons, following orders, complying with tactical directives, etc. These are the basics that ensure soldiers are protected, prepared and in the right frame of mind. At times, it is necessary to be completely intolerant of mistakes. This was particularly difficult upon arrival in country, as it seemed that soldiers were acting like they were not in a combat area of operations. Units developed too many bad habits from NTC and Pinon Canyon [the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA is the Army's premier site for large-scale armored combat training; Pinon Canyon is a smaller training area associated with Fort Carson, located in southeast Colorado.] in terms of constant vigilance. Power down is critical, but the commander sets the tone and cannot overlook any violation of combat discipline. It took 18.5 years and multiple experiences to internalize Patton’s comment about “how can you get a man to fight if you can’t get him to button his chinstrap?” Unfortunately, this may require a style of leadership that is not popular in today’s Army, but necessary for creating the sense of urgency for compliance to standards.

Inculcating this in the active force is difficult enough. With more and more reservists being called to serve, this is going to be a major issue throughout the Army. Today's Americans, as a rule, don't really like discipline. Because the focus in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard is on retention, trying to create an ethic of discipline among them will be nearly impossible prior to mobilization.

2. Autonomy: The Squadrons' areas of operations were extremely large. Tiger’s AO covered about 100km frontage and Saber’s AO was about 60-70km. Tiger’s area included several villages along the Euphrates starting at the Syrian border and moving east towards Baghdad. Saber’s area was more congested, comprised of dense urban terrain. In both cases, the commanders received very little guidance from higher headquarters beyond “go stabilize the area.” Communications with higher headquarters and higher command were sporadic and infrequent. Tiger’s main communications link for several weeks was a TACSAT phone. Both commanders worked hard to visit their subordinate commanders, but daily face-to-face contact was not possible. As a result, troop commanders operated autonomously as well. Fortunately, the culture of the cavalry is to operate autonomously. In this situation, the concept of autonomy was not new, but the magnitude of the autonomy was a challenge. Leaders at all levels in the Cavalry are used to autonomy and making decisions without specific guidance, but that is the normal mode of operations throughout training, not just specific missions (Note: How do we create this culture in all units, particularly a tank battalion?)

A little cavalry silliness here. One problem the cav has is that it's incredibly insular; officers may spend very little of their career outside cavalry units. This can lead to statements like the one above. Armor units may be more accustomed to operating as a single team, but the officers and soldiers assigned to tank battalions are as capable of operating autonomously as a cavalry squadron. The real issue will be the same for all units: getting used to a significantly higher level of autonomy than they're used to. Training prior to arrival in theater can help with this.

3. Training:

a. The training scenarios at NTC were not adequate preparation for the experience in Iraq. We are not complying with “train-as-you-fight” requirements. For example, in combat we do not involve ourselves in a direct intense engagement fighting through restricted terrain. Rather, we build the enemy situation, destroy the enemy with indirect fires, and then move against a worn down enemy. Additionally, there is no training at the NTC that includes the critical mission sets faced in Iraq combat and stabilization operations: dismounted operations for mechanized forces, convoy operations (execution, security, react to contact), military operations on urban terrain (raids), and civilians on the battlefield (the COB at NTC was so limited it was more of a waste of time and not worth the resources committed).

This has been an issue at NTC for years. NTC is designed to simulate high-intensity conflict, and it does so very well. But the Army doesn't get involved in much high-intensity conflict these days. The solution is not necessarily to remake NTC for Iraq-style fights, although ramping up the stability and support operations requirements would be a significant improvement. But the Army has another training center that provides much of what the LTCs complain are missing at NTC: the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. But mechanized units don't normally rotate through JRTC, so they're not exposed to the JRTC environment. The Army would do well to start rotating heavy units through JRTC in the future to better prepare them for operations like Iraq.

b. Bosnia: The best preparation for combat and stabilization missions is Bosnia. The experience there prepared junior leaders for interacting with local populations, establishing agencies, working with the local police force, manning checkpoints, conducting searches, and executing patrols. Many non-commissioned officers and officers have experience in that environment, which helped in the unit’s transition from combat to stabilization operations. The primary difference between Bosnia and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] is the hostile environment. Commander’s needed to emphasize the necessity of killing when appropriate, because soldiers were initially hesitant. LTC Dolan developed and disseminated a philosophy of “Be alert, be paranoid, and be ready to kill”. This was a major difference in mindset from the Bosnia experience.

For those, like me, who've argued that we should get out of Bosnia, this is interesting news. If Bosnia can provide low-risk training for missions like Iraq, then our staying there may be more valuable than I had believed. This is true only if we return to rotating active duty units through Bosnia, however, as they're the ones who are really going to benefit from the training.

c. Tactical Principles: All the principles for high intensity combat operations still apply in combat and stabilization missions. It is imperative to classify the missions for what they are – combat operations. As such tactical principles of security, supporting fires, over watch positions, etc. still apply. In this regard, combat training is good preparation for conducting raids.
d. Combined Arms Operations: “Thank God we trained combined arms at all levels and developed independent operators in missions like counter-reconnaissance.” Combined arms operations at every level were critical for mission success. Each mission involved scouts (mounted and dismounted), military police, counter-intelligence troopers, infantry (mounted and dismounted), and aviation. It was not unusual to integrate or operate with ODAs during raids. Every platoon leader and platoon sergeant was trained in air-ground integration. Troop commanders integrated the combined arms assets on the ground. Squadron staff managed other combined arms assets in the fight. At one point, 2/3 ACR was up to 1900 personnel with 4 cavalry troops, 1 tank company, 1 infantry company, 1 military police platoon, counter-intelligence attachments, 1 aviation troop, and one engineer company [as opposed to a normal squadron of 3 cavalry troops and one tank company]. The level and intensity of combined arms was significant enough at every level that branch distinction became irrelevant.

This is one area where cavalry does have an advantage. Unlike most combat units, ACRs are task organized as low as the troop level, with an organic mortar section in every cavalry troop and a howitzer battery assigned to each squadron. I've heard many cavalry officers argue that the Army should go 100% cavalry, so that all units are accustomed to task organization at all times. While this argument has merit, there are benefits to our current structure as well. By consolidating assets like field artillery and combat engineers we're better able to train and sustain them. How much artillery-specific training can a single howitzer battery do compared to an integrated artillery battalion? Shifting the Army structure to complete task organization still might be a good idea, but I'm not convinced that it's a wise plan right now.

e. Urban Operations: Insufficient attention was given to urban operations in previous training. Prior to deployment, 2/3 ACR conducted TM Marauder training – a MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] certification program that trained all scouts on tactics for clearing urban terrain. Upon arrival in country, each squad conducted a live fire exercise for MOUT. The squadron commander is convinced that this saved at least 30 lives. The military police were a tremendous source of expertise of such operations and were critical to successful operations. MOUT needs to be integrated into every training scenario during home station training and CTC [combat training center: the NTC, JRTC, and the combined maneuver training center in Germany] training.

Another long-known but rarely-addressed weak point in Army training. MOUT is hard to train, so many units tend to put it off until it falls off the calendar. Also, there aren't many good MOUT sites out there. To resolve this issue in the short-term, we're going to have to be sure that units going to Iraq are put through extensive MOUT training. In the longer term, the Army is going to have to get serious about MOUT and build extensive MOUT sites at all major training installations while pushing unit commanders to utilize them reqularly.

f. Personal Weapon Qualification: Every soldier needs to qualify on the M9, M16, Close Combat Optical Site, and the PAQ-4. It does not matter if the MTOE assigns every soldier a rifle: every trooper wants (needs) a rifle during these operations.

This is something I've always believed in. When I commanded my company, I turned in my M9 and carried an M4 carbine. It was a nuisance, but I knew that I'd want one in wartime, so I got in the habit of carrying it in peacetime. Assigning additional rifles to combat units would be a good move, as there are insufficient rifles under the current MTOE to so equip all soldiers.

4. Situational Awareness

a. SA was built from the bottom up. Very little information was provided from higher headquarters. Interaction with the population provided intelligence leads that were collected, verified, analyzed, and distributed at the Squadron Level. For a piece of information to be considered “actionable intelligence,” it required three sources. The situation was difficult to understand because of the variety of “enemy networks” (my term). There were tribal, political, and military organizations that combined to form an overall enemy situation. Sometime these networks overlapped, but it was difficult to differentiate and identify how the networks exercised control over a town or neighborhood. The lack of quality intelligence made overall SA difficult. The commander positioned himself at what he though was the critical point for the night, but was almost always wrong.

b. SA during raids is very similar to SA during combined arms high intensity conflict, so previous HIC training was beneficial. The main components of SA remain the same: see the terrain, see the enemy, see yourself. Satellite imagery became essential for seeing the terrain. The resolution on these pictures was sufficient to provide a detailed understanding of a particular building and the immediate surrounding area. Information from locals could help build an understanding of the building’s interior, but this was often gained through personal reconnaissance or quick assessment during the actual operation. Understanding the friendly situation was done through traditional map battle tracking, FM communications, and verbal shouting once the operation began. Enemy situation was developed through the intelligence sources from the local population and reports during the actual operation. Troopers had to make quick assessments of the buildings interior layout and the hostile nature and location of the building occupants.

c. SA at checkpoints requires constant vigilance during checkpoint operations. The friendly situation is rarely static. Troopers can also gain a good understanding of the terrain through imagery, reconnaissance, and occupation of the checkpoint. (A constantly changing aspect of the terrain is the location of vehicles, people, market stands, etc. that are constantly changing. Each time a vehicle enters the AO it alters the terrain situation.) The enemy situation is difficult to understand. Distinguishing friend from foe is extremely difficult. The actions of the various potential enemies on the battlefield are difficult to distinguish from routine activity. All members of the team are constantly updating indicators of enemy demeanor, vehicle speed, hostile intent, or aggressive action. The situation can change to a hostile combat scenario in seconds. One checkpoint operation that resulted in friendly and enemy casualties took less than 30 seconds and started with the routine inspection of a vehicle. One occupant of a vehicle was discovered to have hand grenades and explosives tied to the backsides of his legs underneath a robe that completely masked the explosives. The speed of each incident and the nuances of enemy action require each soldier at the checkpoint to develop their own understanding of the enemy situation.

Training is going to have to become both quicker and more frequent to deal with issues like this. Army training tends to be based on lanes, where the units know that they'll begin an exercise, undergo training, then end the exercise. With more and more deployments involving ongoing threats, the 'game-on' mentality is going to have to be defeated. That's going to be very hard, and will require a lot of work throughout the Army.

d. Navigation without GPS is still a critical skill. Blue force tracker is not available at all levels and types of vehicles. Leaders must still be able to navigate my map and compass to ensure an accurate understanding of the friendly situation.

This is a huge issue. Since the introduction of GPS technology, land navigation skills have dropped dramatically. This was a factor in the ambush in Nasiriyah, and it will continue to be a problem unless we start putting the GPS away and only pulling it out in combat situations. We'll get lost some, but we'll also learn to start really navigating again.

5. Initiative: Commanders and units were faced with situations they had not seen. There were no established SOPs for reference. There was not specific guidance from higher headquarters, only a general mission statement. Leaders at all levels had to make decisions with incomplete information and no historical precedence. Most of the learning was by trial and error, but decisions had to be made. Decisions ranged from how to establish a forceful presence to whether or not to use white light on a night patrol through a city. Commanders decided how to run city council meetings, how to pick a police chief, when to act on intelligence, where to patrol, how to pay government employees, how to conduct a raid, how to empower Iraqis’, and how to distribute critical supplies. Each day commanders faced situations for which they had no reference on how to make a correct choice. The inability to act or decide would paralyze a unit. Leaders must act and then learn. LTC Dolan said one of the best decisions he made was his choice for chief of police. Both commanders acted before guidance was issued from higher. Sometimes their actions were in compliance with higher guidance, sometimes they weren’t. In the cases when their actions were not in compliance, each commander was faced with how to resolve the difference.

This is why developing good officers and NCOs is so damn important. The only way people learn to make decisions is by making decisions. When they screw up, they pay the price, and they learn to make better decisions. Units that don't allow their people to take responsibility will not be successful in an environment like Iraq.

6. Force protection is much more difficult and important in this environment. As mentioned earlier, combat discipline is the number one contributor to force protection. Leaders have a moral obligation to enforce discipline using any necessary leadership style. Soldiers are under threat from the moment they leave through the gate of their compound. Proper wear of the uniform and tactical measures for security are critical. Every attachment must be held to the same standard as your unit. Don’t trust anyone outside your unit. Assume every Iraqi wants to kill you. Be paranoid. Be ready to kill. Know the rules of engagement and don’t emplace additional constraints. You must develop a mentality that everything is a combat environment, especially upon arrival in country.

The above was a compilation of notes from a visit by LTC Jeff Peterson. He was kind enough to write them out and share them.

That’s a name I like to see. I’ve known Jeff since I was a lieutenant. He’s one of the finest officers it’s ever been my privilege to serve with.

Additional notes from LTC Dolan:

The Army is broke at the operational and at times tactical level, when it comes to communication. The fix, in my opinion, is at the acquisition level and must be done soonest. At the tactical level, the best advice I can give is train commo specific tasks at extended ranges to possibly include sending our signal units to PCMS (Pinon Canyon) to force communications back to Carson. Tactical units (non-signal) need to train over extended ranges and plan for retrans at all levels. In this planning, the force protection for these nodes is also critical.

We really need to get the signal guys from Korea to work on this. If you can communicate in Korea, you can talk anywhere. Unfortunately, it seems those skills don’t seem to translate to the rest of the Army very well.

Incorporate more media training at home station. We have learned that we mist use media to tell our story. The training interviews merely scratches the surface. We also need to train embedded media. (BTW-a great concept that I think I took full advantage of.)

Convoy operations and gunnery. CSM Murphy has a great gunnery plan for convoys, but the training must start at the individual level with personal weapons, then step up to all of the next levels. The training must be realistic, meaning wide ranges where soldiers can fire from a ring mount or even out of the back of a HMMWV or LMTV. Also, train at ranges from 5-1500 meters. We had firefights that were 1 meter and some out to over 1000 meters. I also worked in test fire ranges outside of base camps. Also, authorized HHT to conduct “recon by fire” on the main MSR and to have them turn this into a training event, as if they were reacting to an ambush.

Training to the ROE [rules of engagement]. It took me some time and chewing ass to get our boys to shoot first. Ensure in the home station training that the ROE is clearly understood and that soldiers understand what “imminent danger” is, and who determined when that is. Bottom line is the person that is threatened is the one who makes the call, and that young trooper needs to know he can shoot and the ROE and the chain of command cover his actions.

A/G integration must be trained to at least the squad leader level. The training should include how you talk to the aircraft, what capabilities are being brought to the fight, and the limitations the aviators work under. Can’t say enough about training for MEDEVAC. The nine line isn’t as critical as just getting the grid, number of causalities, and severity of the injuries. We must train on how to secure and mark an LZ both day and night, but especially night. The only day MEDEVACs we used were to fly patients from our base camp who were in non-critical condition. Marking LZs is an important as making the call. Our medic pilots will fly anywhere to save our guys, but they need to see where they are needed.

Cultural training. We need to incorporate this better into our training. A two-hour brief in the theater is not enough. The lowest private will be interacting on a daily basis with locals, be it kids or curious Iraqis. Our guys learned a lot of this on the fly or from our interpreters, but we could have done a better job before deploying.

I’m pleased to report that we’re incorporating much of this into the training we’re putting together for a unit that’s preparing to go to Afghanistan. We haven’t received any taskers to train units for Iraq yet, but this will provide further evidence for what we need to make sure they can do.

Some leader specific thoughts:

Our intelligence was home grown. We need to train our S2s [intelligence officers] and commanders on link diagrams, on how to develop CCIRs that can be used actionably, on how to conduct interviews and interrogations for starters. The CI guys were critical and we don’t have enough, but commanders need to be taught what this resource can bring to the fight. Also, how to cultivate sources and snitches.

This is another tough task because S2s in peacetime rarely do much more than inspect unit arms rooms and conduct other physical security tasks. It is incumbent on battalion and brigade commanders to force their S2s to practice intelligence gathering and analysis on a regular basis. Units can receive some training on this as they prepare to deploy, but it’s no substitute for doing it on a daily or weekly basis.

We had to hire our own interpreters. They need to be checked. Sending their name and picture up was not helpful, since these guys weren’t in any intel database. So we need to train our leaders to some extent on this subject. We used US contracted temps to ensure our new translator was not lying or not properly translating.

Leader training needs to look a lot like the Bosnia MRE [mission readiness exercise]. I guess all training does. Dealing with local officials, meeting sheiks, etc.

General Command Notes:

1. Don’t be the XO or S3. The temptation of every commander is to get overly involved in the details of your field grades. Let them do their job so you can do yours. Based on their ability, you can adjust your guidance and oversight, but resist the temptation to do their jobs for them in the name of expediency or short-term quality. Your ability to capitalize on your field grades will be a key element for your unit’s efficiency in systems and ability to successfully operate in your absence. Work them hard, but let them work. “The commander works from the rising to the setting sun, but the XO’s work is never done (Dolan quote).
2. Don’t second guess or overanalyze a situation. Get the best information possible, go with your instinct, make a decision, and move on. To do otherwise is a waste of energy and time.
3. Develop your officer rating philosophy before taking command and take time to explain it to your officers. Define relatively objective criteria for a center mass officer and successful performance. Also, define indicators for how you will determine potential for future service, especially since this is a key dimension of the senior rater block. Take the opportunity to collectively teach officers about the career timeline and key decision they will be faced with during the course of a military career. Then individually mentor as officer approach you with questions.
4. Every 6 months, review your command philosophy. The team changes quicker than you realize. Just because everyone understood you 6 months ago, doesn’t mean they understand you now.
5. Get in and stay in shape. It’s more than being a good example, it’s how you maintain the energy level necessary for command. Don’t compromise. Even work out during deployments and long-term training exercises.
6. Choose your best LT to be your S-1. Put the CPTs in SMO, S4 and S3.
7. For CAV Squadron: Only need one platoon as a lieutenant – one tank or scout. A longer time spent in one platoon is better than shorter tours as a scout platoon. Cav units should organize as quarter troops anyway, exposing the LT to both missions.
8. The commander is omnipotent. You will need to make an effort to force leaders to let other to step up in a variety of missions. Dig deep for the real deal, because there will be a tendency for people to share only the good news or what they think you want to hear.
9. Be ruthless in evaluating talent and potential. Be professional and respectful, but don’t sugarcoat poor performance or poor potential for additional responsibility. You will be sorry if you don’t be very honest in this area…and it’s hard to be honest because it can cause a lot of pain for the recipient.
10. Prepare and practice writing letters to parents of killed troopers. It has to be more than a form letter. The letter must capture enough details to explain the situation without causing unnecessary trauma for the family. The letter should capture enough emotion to be personal and respectful of the soldier’s service. The letter cannot be antiseptic or matter of fact. The letter will create a final memory for the family member and it must be appropriate. They will take time to write. Check the letters of company commanders before they are mailed. Question whether or not a PL needs to write a letter. Practice this by pretending you are writing a letter to yourself about you own son dying in combat. You must make the emotional connection to make the challenge as real as possible.

Having written a letter to the parents of the one soldier I lost while in command, I can vouch for the importance of this. The commander may not even have known the dead soldier very well, which makes it all the more important that he take his time and get the right information to put in the letter for the parents.
11. Pick a stud officer or NCO for rear detachment. If they are good, they will resist being on rear detachment. However, you cannot afford to have a weak rear detachment. They will have only two missions: prepare new soldiers to deploy and take care of families. If there is a regulatory or protocol question, err on the side of taking care of families.
12. Review family notification procedures. The difficulty of cell phones and e-mail is that notification is difficult to control. Rumors and incorrect information flows freely and the family often “hears something” long before official notification takes place. This is another reason for a strong rear-detachment commander. This procedure must work in concert with higher headquarters, which has its own procedures for notification, but they often lag behind the rumors that make it home quickly.
13. Your most important training mission is to develop platoon leaders. Spend the majority of your time with them. Be hard on commanders, pushing them to perform.
14. If you don’t feel comfortable taking risks or accepting responsibility for things that could cost you your career, don’t even bother taking the guidon. You will make decisions in information and guidance vacuums. It’s risky, but you must make a decision.
15. Don’t make commanders come to any meeting other than the training meeting. However, you need to hold them accountable for the information given to their representative.
16. No meeting more than an hour – even the training meeting.
17. Never forget the personal touches to make people feel important…award, farewells, the personal note or work of thanks, acknowledging new babies or weddings, going way gifts, volunteer appreciation night, etc.

It’s good to see information like this filtering back from Iraq. While I have some quibbles with a few points, this data is invaluable both for units that are preparing to go to Iraq and units like my own, which will be tasked to prepare others to deploy.

UPDATE (9/17/03): If any of the jargon is confusing, leave a question in the comments and I'll explain it as best I can.

Posted at 04:32 PM · War: Lessons Learned · Comments (10) · TrackBack (4)