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December 24, 2004

Problems in the Reserve Component

So I see that a number of soldiers from the units I've been involved in training for the past six months claim they received inadequate training (link requires registration). Since I've been a firsthand participant in some of this training, and present for all of it, I thought I'd add a few firsthand observations about the claims.

I should note up front that I have been less than thrilled with many aspects of the training we've given these units. Because FORSCOM has such a long list of required tasks each unit going to Iraq is expected to complete, and because Reserve units simply aren't able to arrive at the training with the prerequisite training complete. I hope to write more about this at some future date, but for now I'll stick to the topic at hand.

It should also be noted that this essay is not intended to minimize the problems cited in the report. There are a number of problems in the Army, and the mobilization of so many National Guard and Reserve units is bringing those problems to light. However, I think the report omits (probably through a combination or ignorance and shoddy reporting) the source of many of the problems National Guard and Reserve units face.

The first issue cited is equipment problems. An NCO is quoted complaining that the unit's M60 machine guns were in poor condition, presumably so bad the unit couldn't use them in battle. Now the report does note that the problem began with the unit's mobilization, which would lead the thinking reader to the right answer: the weapons were in poor repair when the unit mobilized, meaning the problem lies not with the training they received when they arrived at Fort Bliss, but with their weapons maintenance program at home station. If they let their weapons deteriorate to such a degree they could no longer be fired, it seems to me that there's a bigger problem there than the training they received once they mobilized.

But this discussion also overlooks one more important issue: nobody is going to Iraq with M60 machineguns [Update: Dave tells me that some units are, in fact, deploying with M60s. I will have to ask around to see if we ended up running some M60 ranges I never heard about.]. The Army is in the process of removing the M60 from the arsenal and replacing it with the M240B, a superior weapon. While I welcome someone telling me I'm incorrect, I don't believe any unit is going to Iraq with the M60. I do know that every unit we've trained went to the ranges with M240Bs, not M60s. Given that going into battle with dysfunctional weapons is a serious issue, Mr. Gold would have done well to dig a little deeper before leaving his readers with that impression.

Next we hear about soldiers going to Iraq without having had a chance to fire the weapons they will use in theater. I suspect that is inaccurate, as we are not permitted to send units out of here until every member has fired his or her personal weapon. If the writer is referring to crew-served weapons, he may be correct, as everyone is not required to fire their crew-served weapons prior to deployment. But they certainly have had the chance. In the last ten days leading up to the Christmas break, my brigade was nearly consumed with running ranges for units who had not yet gotten all of their personnel to the various ranges we'd run in the preceding months.

When we run ranges, we generally can count on two things: the unit will not have conducted good PMI prior to arrival, and the unit won't bring all of their personnel to the ranges. Failure to conduct PMI guarantees that many of the soldiers arrive on the range without the training necessary to qualify their weapons; indeed, we often see soldiers show up who don't even know how to load the weapon they're on the range to fire. This means that much of our training time is eaten up with teaching the soldiers about their weapons rather than helping them fire them. Add in the fact the units don't ensure that all of their soldiers are there for the training and it should surprise no one that not every soldier is firing their weapon prior to deployment.

There are problems with the National Guard and Reserve units we're sending to Iraq. I'm quite confident that there are ways we can improve our training program here at Fort Bliss. But the problems we face go much farther than what a training brigade can provide. The biggest problems we face are systemic issues with the Guard and Reserve, problems that will take us years to fully resolve. But one big problem this article has running through its quotes and incidents is one that needs to be fixed sooner rather than later: the question of quality leadership for these units. Bad equipment, soldiers who don't get trained because they don't show up for ranges: these are leadership issues. And if the leadership of these units can't get their soldiers to attend weapons training prior to going into a combat theater, how can we expect them to lead troops into battle?

I will have more on this after Christmas.

Posted at December 24, 2004 05:51 PM

Andrew Olmsted

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Comments

Appreciate reading those details from the Inside. I'm well aware of the hype run constantly by media/s, please, blog away!

The frustration with superiors is the history(and the future) of the world... Years ago I read Carnegie's "How to Win Friends and Influence People." The book is oft touted as a salesmans book but there are powerful ideas in it on psychology and getting things done. Writing about chain of command made me think of it.

Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays.

Posted by: John in PA at December 25, 2004 11:32 AM

Umm, I hate to say it, but we do have M60s over here... Most of our units have already gone forward to Iraq with them, because there are no 240Bs to replace them with (aviation ends up at the back of the line for crew-served weapons, since the ground maneuver guys need them more).

Posted by: Dave at December 26, 2004 03:49 AM

Dave,

That's why I hedged, but the unit in question is part of a light infantry brigade, and I remember having to run numerous M240B ranges for them. Still, even if they did end up bringing M60s, the fact remains they should have worried about maintaining them when they were at home station.

Posted by: Andrew at December 26, 2004 08:20 AM

Reading this gave me an uncomfortable feeling in the pit of my stomach. Getting every last member of the unit to ranges to qualify with their assigned weapon was always a problem. People were always dispersed across a wide area, although that is no excuse. The familiarization with the non-assigned weapons was even more of an issue and that was limited more by ammunition availablity.

Back in the old days of Vietnam we learned to shoot everything we could get our hands on. A place like that creates great incentive.

Weapons maintenance and readiness has no excuse. It has been my experience that there is always a willing core of troops that will go to the arms room and do the care and cleaning that is needed. These are your typical gun-guys. My guys had a special fondness for the M-14s and M-3 grease guns that were still in the arms room racks. We even managed to acquire a limited amount of ammo to use them on occasion.

Posted by: Bruce R at December 26, 2004 08:58 AM

The problem of fudged training and maintenance records is as old as martinet field grade and sneaky lifer senior NCOs. OIF is 2 years old.
Is there still a function in the army called the IG? Do you talk to your Brigade CO? Does he/she talk to the reserve unit's Brigade CO? Why is a court martial not called for? Same old shit--
FTA

Posted by: Rod Dougherty at December 26, 2004 09:55 PM

Hmmmm, why is a court-martial not called for? Probably because a) I don't know if any regulations have been violated (the weapons were a problem before deployment; that doesn't mean the unit was falsifying their records); b) given the difficulty states are having filling units when they're called on to send them, court-martials would only cause additional problems.

What we have here is a systemic problem that will take more than a quick fix to resolve.

Posted by: Andrew at December 26, 2004 10:11 PM

I have to agree with Andy on the issue of maintenance - as I pointed out, we still have M60s ourselves. However, every single one of ours is fully functional, because we have an armorer who takes his job very seriously. One of the problems throughout the Guard is a lack of trained personnel. I've seen some very well-meaning armorers, trying to do the right thing, who just didn't know what they were doing. In some cases that can be even worse than neglect, and the unit pays for it when they go to use the weapons.

Posted by: Dave at December 26, 2004 10:45 PM

If they are as prepared as the last Guard unit I served in when they arrive for training, I wouldn't expect them to be able to polish boots. In my 6 months in my tank unit that had no tanks, we did not a lot. We would sit in the barracks for a weekend planning on where we would get liquor. Occasionally they would pull the Camp Ripley tanks out of the motor pool, put fuel in them, and pull them back in. Then, we would go home and talk about what a great job we did. Out most challenging manuever was getting everyone in formation and then to the barracks.

I was in 2 Guard units and it seemed that most of the people joined for reasons other than military service. I also saw it on active duty, but then you were forced to be a little more prepared just by doing it everyday. I went to one range where the NCOIC didn't know how to adjust the sights and noone knew how to perform SPORTS. I think we should try to treat the Guard/Reserve components more like real soldiers if we are going to use them as such. Doing less puts all of our troops in more danger.

I actually left the Guard after I got an award following our FTX for not complaining and doing extra work. I was bored most days and volunteered to help out on almost everything while others complained about every little task they were asked to do. Maybe it was because I had just come off active duty and had worked for a slave driving commander, and maybe it was becasue I just don't like to sit still, but I had to have something to do in the middle of nowhere. I knew that they weren't people I felt safe going to war with and I left.

Posted by: Scott at December 27, 2004 10:32 AM

On several occasions I was tapped to assist CANG tank outfits undergoing AT at Fr Irwin. At the time (early 80's) they were still using M48A5s which were actually the rent-a-tank fleet kept at Irwin for the blue force units as they rotated in and out. For the most part the soldiers acted like they wanted to be there and were enjoying the AT. This included a mix of company level maneuvering and live fire exercises. I was pleasantly surprised in general. I also had dealings with a KYNG tank outfit whose soldiers also acted like what they were doing mattered, they weren't just putting in time for a paycheck and next semester's tuition.

Having said all that I still believe that the Guard would benefit by having Bn level and above staffs, as well as a proportion of the logistical units in each Bde be in the Active Army and have primary responsibility for the end strength and training of the guard units subordinate to them as well as being the headquarters that would deploy with them.

Posted by: JSAllison at December 28, 2004 10:09 AM

For the slow kids, what's PMI, Andrew?

Posted by: Jim Henley at December 29, 2004 08:17 AM

PMI is Preliminary Marksmanship Instruction: basic training on the weapons you're preparing to shoot. It includes training on your sight picture, loading and unloading the weapon, firing techniques, and clearing jams. On the active side of the house it's supposed to be a refresher course for the soldiers so they've handled the weapon recently before they hit the range. For the reserves, it is often the first time the soldiers are handling the weapon, so when they don't do PMI, we get soldiers on the ranges who don't even know how to load the weapon correctly. This can lead to significant delays in getting ranges completed.

Posted by: Andrew at December 29, 2004 08:26 AM

Give us our due - every Marine spent weeks on the rifle range before even leaving boot camp. Then (and this is Vietnam era so it may be different now) four weeks of basic infantry training. I bet I could still fire any weapon up to a mortar with reasonable accuracy, and it's been about 30 years. For the amount of money that was blown on Comanche you could train every person in the Army to shoot.

History is a hard teacher, but one would assume that the Army would have learned this lesson in Korea.

Posted by: Mark at December 29, 2004 11:17 AM

I have been out for about 4 years now and I could probably still do pretty well in weapons quals, but my trainign and attitude was different than the people I met in the Reserves and Guard. Although I never really believed I would be deployed anywhere, I approached the weapons and ranges like I would be put into a situation where I needed to use them. My friends in the Guard approached weapons training in basic like something they had to do to pass, but I never got the sense that they believed they may some day have to use them.

Posted by: Anonymous at December 29, 2004 11:24 AM

Mark,

History's lessons tend to fade rather quickly. Particularly when you're talking about support troops, they have so many real-world missions it's very easy for commanders to put aside requirements like weapons training.

Posted by: Andrew at December 30, 2004 01:56 PM

Posted by: cialis at January 18, 2005 11:13 PM

December 24, 2004

Problems in the Reserve Component

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