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« Possession | Main | Lost Blogs » March 08, 2004The Coming TroubleAmid all the concerns regarding the costs of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is facing another financial crisis that is getting far less publicity. The United States Armed Forces is remarkably well-equipped, although the shortages it does have are well-documented by the media and those seeking to find a line of attack on the Bush administration. From the M1 Abrams, the best tank in the world, to the F15 and F16 fighters that provided the precision fire support that helped to keep the coalition casualties to a minimum during the war, American military might is second to none around the world. Unfortunately, this situation is a precarious one. The newest major weapon system in the American arsenal is the B2 Spirit, aka the Stealth bomber. It was first used in the Kosovo Campaign, and its development dates back to the late 1980s. The M1 and M2, the Army's primary mechanized vehicles, both were developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The F15 dates back to the early 1970s. The list goes on and on, with old equipment that gets no newer, and that has no replacement in sight. For most of the existence of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, units would fly or bus to the Fort and draw a set of equipment to fight from there, rather than using their own equipment. The vehicles were notoriously poorly maintained, and units that were able to muster 85% of their assigned vehicles for a given battle were considered to be in good shape. My last journey there as a player was in 2000 when I served with 1-68 Armor (currently in Iraq). 1-68 AR has the oldest set of tanks in the active inventory; during our final train-up for NTC at Pinon Canyon in southeastern Colorado, we had so many tanks break down, we were forced to fight the last battle with only platoon leaders and above riding tanks. When we arrived at NTC, the Observer/Controllers were amazed at how well we were able to keep the NTC fleet running, but compared to our own tanks, the NTC fleet was a pleasure to use. Thanks in no small part to the improved logistics flow available during combat operations, the battalion was able to keep its systems running during the war, although I'll wager there were more maintenance problems during the drive north of Baghdad than were reported by the media. Fifteen year old vehicles are going to break down, particularly under the stresses of combat. Yet the current intent of the Army is to maintain an average fleet age of fifteen years, and that age will almost certainly go up soon. There are no new tanks rolling out of any factories in the United States, and there is no replacement for the M1 even on the planning boards at the moment. Given that the Army first began planning the M1 in 1972, that means we are the better part of a decade away from any replacement for the Abrams. So we will see the current fleet continue to get older and less reliable, with no hope of a replacement on the horizon. There are some very smart people out there who believe that the day of the tank is over. And they may be correct, as far as the heavy tank is concerned. As great as the Abrams is, it is obscenely heavy, which makes it very difficult to deploy. That's a huge drawback for the American Army, which is by nature and necessity an expeditionary Army. The Abrams' weight also means it cannot cross many bridges unless they have been significantly reinforced, making it of much-reduced or no worth in terrain such as southwestern Europe or Korea. But people who point to these failings to argue that the age of the tank is over forget that the operational requirement for the tank has existed far longer than just the past century. Whether it was men trained to fight from horses, chariots, war elephants, camels, or any of the many other possible conveyances humans used before we developed the internal combustion engine, armies have always had mounted combatants. An army needs the ability to penetrate its enemy's defenses and take the fight to the enemy's weak points. It needs the ability to scout. And it needs the ability to carry armaments greater than any person can bear into combat. Call the delivery device what you will, it's still a tank, and the U.S. Army is still going to need one for future wars. And right now, we’re not even thinking about that need. Yes, the Army has brought out the Stryker, but the Stryker isn’t going to be able to fill all of the roles the Army needs. Wheeled vehicles like the Stryker will offer great speed over roads, but they will be of very limited utility for off-road work, and that is where wars tend to be fought. Some kind of tracked vehicle will be required for those battles. Set-piece battles are also not going to go away, although they will be a smaller part of war than in the past, and for those fights the Army is going to want something heavily armed and armored. Apparently, the answer to both of these needs will remain the Abrams for the foreseeable future. So too will the Bradley and the Apache remain the Army’s prime infantry fighting vehicle and attack helicopter for the next decade or more, apparently. How many people out there would feel comfortable driving around in a ten year old car as their primary transportation? How about fifteen years old? Because that’s what we’re requiring our soldiers to do over the next decade. If we don’t start developing some new weapon systems to replace those we’re using now, we face the very real possibility of allowing our military to slide into second-rate status. It would be nice to believe that we could afford to do this, but there is little evidence to suggest that the world will become any safer over the next ten years. Maintaining a powerful military is one of our best tools for preserving the peace, which is advantageous not only to us, but to the world. It would be a shame for our understandable focus on our present requirements to lead us to neglect future needs. Posted at March 8, 2004 07:39 PM
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» The price from Cold Fury Tracked on March 10, 2004 09:43 AM CommentsDuring my one assignment at Ft Carson (early '80's) 4ID (M) had, along with the rest of the army, similar difficulties dealing with elderly equipment. I had M60A1s whose hulls were older than their crewman (they were actually M60s that had been rebuilt to A1 standards). Part of the problem was age, part was a result of Brigade '75, in which the division had an additional brigade stationed in Germany and every 6 months the brigade overseas was replaced by one of the 3 brigades at Carson (personnel and personal weapons only) which meant that the equipment changed hands twice a year overseas, and every two years at Carson. Needless to say, keeping the equipment up ranked real low on anyone's 'to do' list. This program had ended shortly before my assignment there but we were feeling the aftereffects for years. Just as I came on board, the division was tasked to send a group to Honduras to conduct various civic action type things, amounted to roughly a batallion in strength with equipment. The division couldn't field the group without combing the post for serviceable equipment down to and including pistols and holsters (my unit had to give some of each up for this) Our deployment to NTC turned into a MaintEx where our goal became to help those to follow us by trying to fix the 'equipment' that we were expected to use. We actually saw OPFOR once or twice though only 10-15% of the tanks were capable of firing during the live fire phase and my vehicle spent more time on the ass end of a HETT than under it's own power. Our illustrious chain of command decided to act in the belief that decrepit equipment and shortages of money and personnel were meaningless and the true solution was to be...wait for it...more command emphasis on 'proper' PMCS-ing using 'proper' 2404s and done by the numbers with commanders in the motor pool and lots of charts (manual powerpoint). This period was probably the low point of my career in terms of my ability to trust my chain of command to be looking out for our collective interests. We used to joke that 4ID was the army's only active duty national guard division although what I saw of the guard tank units led me to believe that they were in general in better shape than we were as they were putting fewer miles on their vehicles than we were. But, it did get better, eventually. Posted by: JSAllison at March 9, 2004 10:30 AM My concern is that we may be moving back towards those bad old days. Not soon, but it takes so damn long to get something down the pipeline, the odds are pretty good we will face a significant gap in capabilities that we'll have to rush to make up. Of course, this is a long and honorable American tradition in our military history... Posted by: Andrew at March 9, 2004 05:38 PM During my last couple of years at Knox I tried to convince the powers that be that older equipment tended to have faults that weren't addressed in the manuals and that we should be harvesting and documenting these things. No joy though, not sexy enough, I guess. I'm wondering though, whether a system like the M1A2 would be as susceptible to aging as say, the M60s of my youth. The M60s represented an almost entirely mechanical approach which would suffer from wear and tear in all it's systems over time. In the M1A2 a modular structure and the use of electronics to replace a good bit of the old mechanicals I suspect would tend to mitigate the effects of aging, at least, in part. The plug-n-pray architecture lends itself to repair by replacement more easily. I was around at the end of the Sheridan's shelf life, also that of the M60 series. My jedi sense of the state of the systems in a current state of the art MBT is not the same as it was in the earlier vehicles. You could almost hear them aging in the track park, I don't get that so far from what we're using now. The other side of this coin is that I strongly suspect that heavy divisions are going to get few and far between on the ground and a potential replacement for either the Abrams or Bradley is not likely to have a fleet buy of equal numbers. This will help to drive up unit costs. Also likely means that we're going to be using what we have til they fall apart. This is the army's equivalent to what the AF is facing in re replacing the F15s and 16s. As the replacement fleet gets scaled back unit costs go up and we start wondering if we're really needing to spend so much for so little... Posted by: JSAllison at March 10, 2004 10:18 AM JS, that's probably an accurate assessment. Just as we've done with the Sheridan, slowly cutting away units that use it until only the 11th ACR at NTC has any, we'll probably see more divisions move to some kind of motorized configuration. Which won't be too bad as long as we don't have to do any heavy fighting, but I suspect that the odds of us having to do more fighting are inversely proportional to the number of heavy divisions we have. Posted by: Andrew at March 10, 2004 06:10 PM |