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November 07, 2003

Helicopter Defense in Iraq

With the second shootdown of an American helicopter in Iraq in a week, it's clear we're going to have to alter our tactics to address the enemy's new focus. Helicopters are vital for the success of the occupation, as it would be next to impossible for U.S. forces to maintain a presence throughout Iraq without the ability to move troops via helicopter. Our enemies have probably recognized this, and will do their best to take advantage of it. It is imperative we alter our tactics to address their new tactics, otherwise the news of helicopter crashes will quickly become commonplace.

The Somali warlords recognized the vulnerability of helicopters to ground fire in Mogadishu a decade ago. No matter how much armor you place on a helicopter, the tail rotor remains vulnerable to direct fire. Because RPGs are cheap and plentiful in much of the world, they're a great anti-helicopter weapon. One RPG needs a very lucky shot to bring down a helicopter, but if you volley fire four to six of them, you've got a better than even chance for a kill. Add to that the fact that the enemy only needs to succeed occasionally and the high visibility of a helicopter crash and you have an excellent method of attack for terrorists.

The problem is made worse because helicopters are virtually invulnerable on the practice battlefields where the Army trains. It is difficult to simulate the many threats helicopters face on the real battlefield in training, because the primary goal when training is not to get anyone killed. Therefore, helicopter pilots generally face a far safer battlefield in training than they do in combat, and they learn how to fly accordingly. These instincts can be fatal in real combat situations. We need to start training our pilots to expect the full gamut of threats they face in places like Iraq.

The best protection for helicopters on a battlefield is altitude. An RPG cannot bring down a helicopter unless it is already very close to the ground. This reduces the ability of the helicopter to support certain ground actions, but that is probably a price that needs to be paid. Get the helicopters away from the ground and we can eliminate the most common threat they face, leaving the enemy to rely on surface to air missiles, which are far less common. We also need to start altering the routes our helicopters take when moving from place to place. The enemy isn't stupid, and he works off the same pattern recognition skills we attempt to use against him. If helicopters consistently fly in the same place or at the same time, the enemy can set ambushes to bring them down. While altering routes will make airspace control more complex, it will also make the enemy's job more difficult and will better protect our aircraft and soldiers. This is a good trade.

We're also going to have to clear the areas around airfields. Even if we're flying at high altitudes at random times and varied locations, the aircraft still take off and land from a relatively small number of airfields. The enemy will focus in on these fields so they can engage our aircraft before they can climb above the effective range of RPGs. It is necessary for us to clear a zone around airfields to prevent this. This may involve closing certain airfields because it's not feasible to clear a safe zone around them, or it may require us to put boots on the ground to expand the controlled area around the airfield.

This leaves us with the question of surface to air missiles. While the above tactics will help against SAMs as well, we have to expect that the enemy will be able to use SAMs from a sufficient distance to prevent those measures from being completely effective (in fact, they will not be completely effective even against RPGs, but they will be a far more effective countertactic to RPGs than to SAMs.). Spoofing SAMs may require more than just changes in tactics, but changes in technology. Because SAMs track the heat signature emitted by a helicopter's engine, we may need to refit our helicopters with devices to cool the engine exhaust, as well as flare dispensers that can try to coax the SAMs to detonate prematurely by fooling them into mistaking a burning flare for their target. And there are probably other technological tricks available for protecting helicopters as well. These devices will only be successful, however, if training and tactics are altered to use them to their best advantage.

Altering our tactics will not make our helicopters invulnerable. It is certain that more American troops will be killed when helicopters are shot down. But improving our tactics can keep helicopter losses to occasional tragedies, rather than allowing them to rise to the level of unacceptable losses.